property rights; as things valuable in and of themselves, rather than for the product goodwill they embody. Courts protect trademark owners against uses that would not have been infringements even a few years ago and protect as trademarks things that would not have received such protection in the past. And they are well on their way to divorcing trademarks entirely from the goods they are supposed to represent.
Unfortunately, the changes in trademark doctrine over the last fifty years are not supported by the new economic learning. Rather, these changes have loosed trademark law from its traditional economic moorings and have offered little of substance to replace them.
Brown's doctrinal approach offers a healthy dose of common sense in thinking about trademark law. While some of his observations about the economics of advertising should be read in light of more recent economic work, his philosophical and doctrinal observations about trademark doctrine and its fit with economic theory are worth reconsidering in light of the trends in trademark doctrine. In Part I of this Essay, I provide a brief sketch of the economic foundations of trademark law, considering both Brown's article and some of the new learning on the economics of advertising. I argue that the new economic learning, while useful, does not fundamentally change the nature of trademarks. In Part 11, 1 argue that recent developments threaten to stretch the rationale of trademark law beyond all limits, and in Part II, I offer some preliminary thoughts on how we might restore common sense to the Lanham Act. Though space constraints prevent a full exposition of these ideas, I will offer some general ways in which courts and commentators might better align the goals and outcomes of trademark law.
I. RALPH BROWN AND THE ECONOMICS OF ADVERTISING
Brown's approach to trademark doctrine is to determine the goals of trademark law and then to determine how well the doctrine comports with these goals. For Brown, the goals of trademark law are bound up with the "informative function" of trademarks. Trademarks are a compact and efficient means of communicating information to consumers. By granting ownership rights over trademarks, we serve the twin goals of encouraging investment in product quality and preventing consumer deception. 4 Brown quotes Learned Hand's useful admonition that " [w] e are nearly sure to go astray in [trademark law] as soon as we lose sight of the underlying principle that the wrong involved is diverting trade from the first user by misleading customers who mean to deal with him.", 5 For Brown, the wisdom of trademark doctrine can be measured by how well it hews to that purpose.
In particular, Brown was at pains to reject arguments that the law should protect trademarks either because of the perceived unfairness of competition by others, 6 or as property in and of themselves. 7 He also expressed great concern with what he saw as the risks advertising posed for competition, in particular its capacity for artificial brand differentiation and a consequent stifling of competition even in largely homogenous product markets.' He was particularly concerned about advertising that sought to persuade rather than to inform. He described the theoretical case for the benefits of advertising as dubious and the empirical case as nonexistent.' Brown was by no means alone in raising these challenges; opposition to advertising was perhaps a product of the times.' 0 The field of economics has responded well to some of Brown's challenges. In particular, while economists have by no means reached a consensus regarding the economic function of trademarks, they have offered considerable empirical evidence-both positive and negativeregarding the actual effects of trademarks and advertising. 1 Whatever the empirical case, economists have ,offered at least three positive justifications for both trademarks and advertising. was not yet a serious part of trademark discourse. Nonetheless, Brown's resistance to the idea of trademarks as property in and of themselves can be seen in his discussion of dilution and in his repeated disdain for the "persuasive function of trade symbols." See Brown, supra note 1, at 1190, 1191-94.
8. See Brown, supra note 1, at 1170-75. 9. See id. at 1178. 10. Among the many arguments against the evils of advertising roughly contemporaneous [Vol. 108: 1687 First, they have emphasized the efficiency by which trademarks and advertising communicate useful information to consumers, and thereby reduce consumer search costs. 12 This communication function is particularly important with respect to what might be called "experience" characteristics of goods: those characteristics (such as taste, or perhaps durability) that consumers cannot readily verify except by buying the product. Advertising communicates these characteristics directly, and trademarks ensure that consumers associate the characteristics with the right product. It may also be important with respect to a class of goods called "reliance" goods, whose quality the consumer has little way of judging at all. 13 Economists have also identified a second, "signaling" function of advertising. On this theory, advertising sends a self-referential message: In effect, "we advertise, and therefore we must sell a good of sufficiently high quality that we can afford this high-cost expenditure." 4 Finally, economists have pointed to the role of trademarks in allowing the growth of complex, long-term organizations spread over a wide geographic area. The ability to connote a variety of things by the use of a set of trademarks permits nationwide sales by a single entity, or alternatively the "franchising" of a trademark to independent producers overseen by the trademark owner. 15 [sic] by reducing the costs of information led to efficiencies in achieved national prominence to travelers without strong trademarks and advertising. Similarly, the general acceptance today of the principle that trademarks can be licensed to others, at least under some circumstances, reflects a world in which the production of goods is less tied to a particular corporate structure than ever before. 6 Many economists and lawyers in the past fifty years have challenged the "monopoly phobia" allegedly exhibited by Brown, Edward Chamberlain, I " and their contemporaries." These scholars start from the presumption that brand names and advertising perform useful social functions and contribute to the economy. 9 This difference in approach surely cannot be attributed to any decline in the significance of ''persuasive" as opposed to "informative" advertising; indeed, persuasive advertising has grown beyond what anyone studying the field in 1948 could have imagined.
2 " It might be attributed to the new economic learning, at least in part. Certainly, the work of Nelson and others has given us a greater appreciation for the positive benefits of brand identification-benefits that Brown seemed to doubt. 2 To give just one example, Brown asserts that production and distribution."); see also 21. The new economic learning does not all support advertising, however. In particular, the economics of game theory-a discipline in its infancy when Brown wrote his article-offers an arguably inefficient explanation for advertising. See generally WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER'S DILEMMA 8-9 (1992) (describing various applications of the prisoner's dilemma). On this theory, advertising may result from a "prisoner's dilemma": Both participants in the market (say, Coke and Pepsi) would be better off not advertising, but each will lose out if its opponent advertises and it does not, so both firms decide to advertise. I think this may well be an accurate description of what is going on in many cases. Unfortunately, as with much of game theory, it is hard to draw robust conclusions from the model about whether this behavior is socially optimal. Certainly, the firms in the prisoner's dilemma model would be better off if they could get together and agree in some binding way not to advertise. But would the public be better off as a result? Not necessarily. This agreement between firms might be a cartel, an agreement not to compete on a salient characteristic of interest to consumers. Whether the outcome of the prisoner's dilemma is socially optimal depends on whether a cutback in advertising is good or bad-precisely the question we seek to answer. Determining the answer to that question in any given case would bread "is in fact pretty much standardized," so that there is no reason for advertising to differentiate bread products.' In fact, however, the modem world features an enormous diversity not only of kinds of bread, but also of qualities of bread. Thus, this example might suggest that the product differentiation facilitated by trademarks is helping consumers choose the optimal bread for them.
But surely this cannot be the whole explanation. There seems no question that advertising contributes to product differentiation not only on the basis of quality, but also among goods of demonstrably identical quality, such as pharmaceuticals.' It is hard to construct a plausible case for product differentiation in such a circumstance. By contrast, the costs of artificial brand differentiation in terms of power over price are quite clear. 24 While advertising may still lower search costs, the participation of government and private agencies that provide consumer information-the Federal Drug Administration (FDA), Consumer Reports, the Better Business Bureau, and even supermarkets and other stores that stock multiple brands-can sometimes be just as effective as advertising.
So why is there no serious hostility to advertising and trademark law among economists today? There are several reasons, some good and some bad. First, economists today are much more reluctant to second-guess the workings of the market than they were fifty years ago. Brown's distinction between informational and persuasive advertising -is troubling because it impels him to conclude that an enormous number of consumers do not really want what they think they want; they have been duped by unscrupulous marketers. Perhaps I am a product of my own generation, but I am loath to jump to such a conclusion. My preference for Diet Coke over Diet Pepsi or any other cola drink may be an irrational one, induced by childhood memories of teaching the world to sing or some similar require an inquiry into any possible informative, market-expanding, market-disciplining, persuasive, or misleading effects the advertising itself would have.
22. Brown, supra note 1, at 1179 n.59. 23. Indeed, trademarks themselves might support this artificial differentiation, as where similar goods from the same manufacturer are given different names in an effort to appeal to different market segments at different prices.
24. See, e.g., Denicola, supra note t, at 1663; Lunney, supra note 19, (manuscript at 6-7). For example, a brief trip to the drugstore will convince anyone that branded drugs cost much more than their generic counterparts, despite having identical ingredients. Brown noted the same phenomenon in his day. See Brown, supra note 1, at 1173. Indeed, companies periodically sell identical products under different brands-and at different prices. See, e.g., Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 601 F.2d 609, 614 (2d Cir. 1979) (noting that Falstaff sold its house brand and its Ballantine brand at different prices "despite identity of the ingredients").
25. See Brown, supra note 1, at 1182-84.
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The Death of Common Sense promotional effort. But in a free market economy, perhaps the choice should be mine to make, for good or ill.26 Second, the economy of 1998 is very different from the economy of 1948. Transactions in services, information, and intellectual property are a growing percentage of the economy. 7 It may be that advertising and brand loyalty are more important in such transactions than they are in the relatively homogenous world of old. Services have many experience characteristics; those who are purchasing an ongoing relationship will need information other than merely price. Similarly, in industries characterized by rapid innovation, a product's quality characteristics may be much more important than its price characteristics over the medium run. Companies who compete on these nonprice characteristics generally must advertise them. Other markets may also require particular sorts of advertising.' Further, as markets become national and international in scope -and customers become more mobile, the role of trademarks in creating a reputation that extends beyond a limited geographic area becomes more important. 29 In short, as the subject matter of commercial transactions becomes more complex and less tangible, reputation becomes more central. On this theory, Brown's views about advertising might be thought outmoded. Perhaps we need advertising (and trademarks) more now than we did in a simpler world.
Finally, there is an increasing tendency to treat trademarks as assets with their own intrinsic value, rather than as a means to an end. In part, this change reflects a broader trend towards "propertizing" intellectual property, a phenomenon that I have described elsewhere.° Someone who thinks of trademarks as equivalent to real or personal property probably will not share Brown's hostility to advertising. Indeed, they may not even think 26 . Glynn Lunney questions whether this deference is appropriate: "Were Pavlov's dogs happier after they had been trained to salivate at the sound of a dinner bell?" Lunney, supra note 19 (manuscript at 58 n.201).
27. it worth asking whether advertising is good or bad, any more than they would second-guess the style of house that someone built on their land.
I think this last explanation-treating trademarks as property-is a remarkable trend worthy of further attention. Why should the law create property rights in trademarks, particularly the strong, unfettered property rights that seem to underlie the "trademarks as property" concept? We don't protect trademarks to encourage the creation of more trademarks, and so the incentive rationale for intellectual property will not work here. 3 " Trademarks may be valuable as vehicles for efficient advertising; protecting their owners against the use of confusingly similar marks will encourage investment in brand quality and simultaneously protect consumers from confusion. 32 But if we are to conclude that the trademark itself is valuable property, we need some rationale beyond these traditional justifications for trademark law.
That rationale turns out to be hard to find, as Brown predicted 3 The new economic learning on brands and advertising ties trademarks to consumer search costs and experience characteristics. But none of these changes has undermined the basic differences among trademarks and other forms of intellectual property. Patents and copyrights are created for an instrumental purpose that is directly related to the subject matter of protection: We want more of the sort of works that patent and copyright law protect. One can construct from this an argument that we should vest the creators of those works with strong property rights, as rewards, incentives, Kratzke has effectively deconstructed the "free riding" or "unjust enrichment" argument against the use of trademarks by competitors. See Kratzke, supra note 12, at 223. In short, Kratzke argues that to call competitive behavior "free riding" is a conclusionary epithet, not a workable economic principle. See id. Free riding is good-indeed, it is the essence of competition-unless there is some reason to think it will lead to a market failure. Were it not for free riding, everything we did, bought, or used would either be purchased at a monopoly price (probably with perfect price discrimination). Cf Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REv. 149, 167 (1992) ("A culture could not exist if all free riding were prohibited within it.").
or inducements to continued investment.' This is not a necessary conclusion; indeed, for a variety of reasons it is probably wrong to treat patents and copyrights as analogous to real property. 35 Even if one accepts this rationale for other intellectual property rights, however, it does not carry over to trademarks. 36 The justifications for trademark law are different from those for other forms of intellectual property.
We give protection to trademarks for one basic reason: to enable the public to identify easily a particular product from a particular source. Allowing this connection to be made in turn has secondary benefits: Consumer surplus is not diminished by fraud; producers can compete on the basis of experience characteristics of goods, and so on. There is no reason to believe that treating trademarks as property is particularly likely to further this goal.
37 After all, we don't necessarily want more new trademarks as an end in itself. 3 " Indeed, we might all be better off in a world with fewer brands clamoring for our scarce attention, and less of the artificial product differentiation Brown derided. Even if we did want more trademarks for some reason, it is far from clear that we would need government-provided incentives to create them. 39 Further, the economic case for brands and advertising is undone to the extent that trademarks are used in ways that affirmatively confuse consumers. 37. William Kratzke argues that ownership of trademarks is, like much real property, designed to solve the problem of overuse of a "commons" of speech involving trademarks. Nonetheless, he notes, treating trademarks as property to which trademark owners are ipso facto entitled "puts the cart before the horse," because it assumes that there is a public policy justification for creating such property. Kratzke, supra note 12, at 203-04; see also Frank Schechter, Fog and Fiction in Trade-Mark Protection, 36 COLUM. L. REV. 60, 65 (1936) (contending that calling trademarks "property" does not help understand the proper scope of trademark protection).
38. See, e.g., Gordon, Self-Expression, supra note 33, at 1588 n.277 (1993) ("Usually a trademark is not purposely created for its own sake; the 'benefit' purposely created is the good will of the owning entity.., which the trademark merely happens to represent."). with the mantle of property-and giving them some of the indicia of real property, such as free transferability--defeats the purpose of linking trademarks to goods in the first place.
Even more troubling, propertizing trademarks comes at a rather significant cost to society. Sometimes that cost takes the form of lost opportunities: Important political and social commentary and works of art may be suppressed entirely. It may also take the form of higher prices: When we protect the design of products as trademarks, we prevent competition in the sale of those products, and the price goes up accordingly. Other social costs are more diffuse, but no less real: Our language and our culture are impoverished when we cannot use the most familiar words to discuss-or make fun of, or criticize-the products and companies that are the basis of our economy. At the very least, it becomes inconvenient to do so. 4 And perhaps most important, trademark licensing is expensive. 4 The more we propertize, the more transaction costs we impose on everyone.
Companies and individuals will have to hire more lawyers, delay introducing their products, and spend money in merchandising fees to acquire the rights to use words, logos, or product configurations. Because trademarks so often overlap, propertization may also reduce certainty, making trademark searching and clearance more difficult and leading to more litigation.
Treating trademarks as property also creates abundant incentives for opportunistic behavior. If trademarks are property, it becomes harder to explain why they do not always belong to whoever grabs them first. The property theory has already led some people to register marks not to be used to identify the source of goods, but solely to lock up the use of the trademarked phrase itself. Thus, one legal entrepreneur has registered "Class of 2000" as a trademark and claims the right to prevent anyone else from selling merchandise bearing the phrase. 42 Another has registered the ubiquitous yellow smiley-face and is collecting money from those who use it. 43 Still another (not the movie producer) claims the exclusive right to sell merchandise with the word "Titanic" on it.' Under traditional trademark law, these claims are frivolous. Trademark law protects source identification; it does not allow people to own designs or phrases outright and to prevent their use regardless of context. Get a copyright, if you can; if not, too bad. But as trademarks continue to be treated .as property, it becomes harder and harder to come up with a convincing reason why one should not be allowed to register "Class of 2000" or the smiley-face and prevent anyone else from using them without a license. Rochelle Dreyfuss has complained of the "privatization" of words and phrases; 4 ' recent cases make it clear that this is not an abstract concern.
In short, the economics of trademark law has grown more sophisticated over the last fifty years, but it has not abandoned its roots. The economic rationale for trademarks today is roughly the same as it was a half-century ago. Unfortunately, the law is quite different. And so Brown's concern with linking trademark doctrine to trademark theory has renewed importance today.
II. THE EXPANDING BOUNDARIES OF TRADEMARK RIGHTS
Courts seem to be replacing the traditional rationale for trademark law with a conception of trademarks as property rights, in which trademark "owners" are given strong rights over the marks without much regard for the social costs of such rights. There appear to be three basic parts to this trend. First, we sometimes seem to be making trademark law for the extreme case, but we then apply that law to a large number of run-of-themill trademarks. Second, courts increasingly treat brands as things owned in their own right, rather than as advertising connected with a particular product. Finally, courts have not been sufficiently sensitive to legitimate free speech concerns in cases where trademark owners seek to restrict noncompetitive uses of the trademark.
A. Making Law for the Extreme Case
In a number of recent instances, trademark law has been expanded quite significantly by means of new legal rules that make sense in a limited number of cases, but that then enter widespread use where they make less 43 
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sense. The tendency is perhaps a natural one. If Congress creates a new statute that protects some but not all trademark owners, every trademark owner will want his or her mark to be included in the new group and will seek to receive the added protections of the new rule. If courts are not careful to restrain the new doctrine, it will soon take on a life of its own. I call this the problem of "doctrinal creep."
Dilution
The most obvious example of doctrinal creep in trademark law is dilution. Dilution laws are directed against the possibility that the unique nature of a mark will be destroyed by companies who trade on the renown of the mark by selling unrelated goods, such as Kodak pianos or Buick aspirin. 4 But because consumers need not be confused for dilution to occur, dilution laws represent a fundamental shift in the nature of trademark protection.
Dilution laws are largely a product of the last fifty years. Approximately half of the states now have dilution statutes. But most recent attention has been focused on the federal dilution statute, which was added in 1995. The federal statute, like most state dilution statutes, protects only "famous" marks. 47 The statute offers a nonexclusive list of eight factors for courts to consider in determining whether a mark is "distinctive and famous." 4 8 The clear intention seems to have been to restrict dilution doctrine to a relatively small class of nationally known trademarks whose fame is sufficiently great that the risk of blurring by multiple noncompeting uses is significant. 49 But courts applying the state and federal dilution statutes have been quite willing to conclude that a local favorite, or a rather obscure company, is "famous" within the meaning of the Act. Thus, marks such as Intermatic, Gazette, Dennison, Nailtiques, TeleTech, Wedgewood (for new homes, not china), Papal Visit 1999, and Wawa have been declared famous. 5 without even inquiring into the fame of the mark. 1 Dilution doctrine has also been expanded to encompass not only noncompeting but also nonidentical marks, 5 " to protect famous trade dress and product configurations, 53 to attack longstanding uses of descriptive marks to describe products, 54 to aid trademark owners in ordinary cases against competitive marks by dispensing with the need to demonstrate consumer confusion, 55 and even to create a cause of action against consumers (or the press) who do not use marks properly. 6 While the federal law is still relatively new, and so prediction is difficult, we may be moving toward a world in which "famous" marks protected even in the absence of consumer confusion are the rule rather than the exception. The result, as one commentator has noted, is to grant a "trademark in gross" -one unconnected to a particular product-to a wide variety of owners. 
Product Configurations
Something similar is happening with product configurations. Courts have recognized for some time that the trade dress of a product, and in certain cases even the shape of the product itself, might qualify for trademark protection. A classic example might be the shape of the traditional Coca-Cola bottle, which clearly serves as an indicator of source to a large number of consumers. Product configurations can be registered, and even unregistered configurations can be protected under section 43(a). 8 Still, until recently, attempts to protect the shape or appearance of goods themselves were relatively rare. Even court decisions permitting such protection, like Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 59 made it clear that it was unusual for the shape of a product actually to serve a sourceidentifying function. 60 In the last fifteen years, product configuration cases have exploded onto the trademark scene. 6 ' Companies have successfully claimed trademark rights in the d6cor of a restaurant, 62 an artistic style of painting, 63 the design of a golf course,' the shape of a faucet handle, 65 the diamond shape of a lollipop, 66 the unique registration process of a toy fair, 67 the shape of a mixer, 6 " and the design of personal organizers, 69 and they have sought The imitation or even complete duplication of another's product or packaging will not create a risk of confusion unless some aspect of the duplicated appearance is identified with a particular source.... As a practical matter, however, it is less common for consumers to recognize the design of a product or product feature as an indication of source. Product designs are more likely to be seen merely as utilitarian or ornamental aspects of the goods. protection for sweater patterns, 0 the shape of troll dolls, 7 the shape of a building, 7 2 the helical blade of fans, 7 " the shape of cable ties, 74 and the shape of Grecian-urn-style plastic planters. 7 Some plaintiffs have even succeeded in protecting as product configurations the very features of their products for which they had previously received a patent. 7 6 As with dilution, what started as an exceptional doctrine for cases in which the risk to goodwill was evident has expanded into a trademark doctrine of general applicability, one that virtually any manufacturer can invoke to secure additional protection for its products. In the process, the 'link between product configuration and consumer source identification has all but disappeared. Once Two Pesos declared that "inherently distinctive" trade dress and product configurations were entitled to automatic protection, 77 numerous plaintiffs who could plausibly characterize their product configuration as "arbitrary" or even "suggestive" sought automatic protection for the shape of their products. 78
Cybersquatters and Domain Names
Courts have also stretched trademark doctrine to accommodate the extreme case involving Internet domain names and "cybersquatters." 78. The classification of trade dress and product configurations as "descriptive," "suggestive," or "arbitrary," the categories used for word marks, is frequently nonsensical. Some circuits have rejected this classification scheme in favor of an inquiry into whether the product configuration is "likely to serve primarily as a designator of origin of the product. Cybersquatters like Dennis Toeppen acted early to, lock up a number of Internet domain names that reflect trademarks or corporate names, for a variety of possible purposes. Courts that have considered suits by trademark owners against cybersquatters have uniformly held that obtaining someone else's trademark as a domain name is either trademark infringement or dilution. 79 In many cases, this is clearly the right result. If I register my competitor's name on the Internet, so that potential customers who enter that name will arrive at my site instead, I am clearly creating confusion in an attempt to profit commercially." In other cases, though, courts have had to stretch the "commercial use in commerce" requirement to the vanishing point in order to "catch" cybersquatters. Thus, courts have held that owning a domain name that you do not use is "use in commerce" if you hope to sell the domain name to the trademark owner. 8 And several courts have even held that noncommercial use of a domain name is "commercial use in commerce," reasoning that any use on the Internet is automatically a use in commerce. 82 This is in striking contrast to the meaning of the term in ordinary trademark cases. 
M. 1997).
82. See Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1434-35 ("The nature of the Internet indicates that establishing a typical home page on the Internet, for access to all users, would satisfy the Lanham Act's 'in commerce' requirement."); Jews for Jesus, 993 F. Supp. at 309. In Bucci, the defendant was an anti-abortion protester who registered "plannedparenthood.com" and used the site to post his political messages. See 42 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1432. In Jews for Jesus, the defendant registered "jewsfojesus.org" and devoted it to criticism of the plaintiff's religion. See 993 F. Supp. at 291.
83. See, e.g., Allard Enters. v. Advanced Programming Resources, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1870 (6th Cir. 1998) (noting that use in commerce means "the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade and not made merely to reserve a mark" (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994)). Indeed, the divergence between the cybersquatting cases and normal dilution cases is so great that the author of the leading trademark treatise now identifies "cybersquatting" as a separate form of dilution, not involving blurring or tamishment. See 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:69.1, at 24-117 (4th ed. 1998).
Toeppen and Bucci are not particularly sympathetic defendants, and trademark or some other law should provide a cause of action against those who capture a domain name that clearly ought to belong to someone else in order to extort money from trademark owners." 4 Still, there is something troubling about the erosion of the commercial use and use in commerce requirements. We may find that extending trademark protection to cover noncommercial uses of a mark, however compelling the instant case, sets a dangerous precedent for the law. Indeed, we need not look too far. The cybersquatter precedents are already being used by trademark owners to take domain names away from arguably legitimate users, such as people who want to register their last names as Internet domains 5 and those who build a "gripe site" to complain about a specific product or company. 
What's Going on Here?
Brown was critical of the entire concept of dilution in his 1948 article, 87 and elsewhere he was critical of product configuration protection as well. 8 Colo. 1996) (involving concurrent use of the word "Clue"). Thus, creating a legal rule to govern domain names is far more complicated than one might imagine from the cybersquatter cases alone.
For an argument that the whole effort may be misguided because it inefficiently channels consumers into using domain names rather than other search technologies on the Internet, see Jon H. Oram, Case Note, The Costs of Confusion in Cyberspace, 107 YALE L.J. 869 (1997).
85. See, e.g., Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 999 F. Supp. 1337, 1342 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (requiring the registrant of "avery.net" and "dennison.net" for common surnames to surrender the domain names to the Avery Dennison Corp., on a dilution theory). In cases that were not litigated to judgment, the corporation that owns the trademarks for the television characters Pokey and Gumby sought to take "pokey.org" away from a 12-year-old boy whose nickname was Pokey, and Archie Comic Publications sought to prevent a family from naming a Web site "veronica.org" after their newborn daughter. By contrast, I do not believe that either doctrine is entirely il-conceived. Dilution laws and protection for product configurations both serve valuable purposes, purposes that find some grounding in trademark theory. Product configuration can sometimes serve a source-identifying function that is well-recognized by consumers: Think of the classic shape of the Coke bottle, for instance. And dilution-at least dilution by blurring" 9 -can "whittle away" the distinctive value of a famous trademark by giving the same mark several different associations. Therefore, protecting product configurations and preventing dilution in appropriate cases will lessen aggregate consumer confusion and thus encourage investment in the quality of the underlying product. 90 Rather, I think the modem dilution and product configuration cases take a good idea and stretch it too far. The problem is that not every product configuration serves a source-identifying function. Indeed, the vast majority do not. Similarly, most trademarks are not sufficiently well-known that their use on unrelated products would create even an association in the minds of consumers. Rather, these legal doctrines are being used to serve other purposes, ones that trademark theory does not support. 9 1 The explosion in product configuration cases in the last twenty years has a lot more to do with acquiring or extending de facto patent and copyright protection through a back door than with protecting consumers from confusion. 92 And the insistence by seemingly every trademark owner that its marks must be thought famous is motivated less by genuine concerns about blurring than by a desire to 'keep up with the Cokes' and get the benefit of the same property protection that truly famous marks now receive. One can understand why trademark owners want these things, of course, but we must look to the public interest, not private interests, to decide whether trademark owners should get them. 93 
B. Brands Take on a Life of Their Own
A second trend in trademark law relates directly to the changing concept of what a trademark is. Rather than considering trademarks as advertisements or referents for the goods to which they are attached, courts are increasingly treating trademarks as if they were property in their own right. 94 In addition to an isolated and perhaps unique Supreme Court reference, 9 5 this trend is evident in at least two different lines of cases. 91 . Kratzke argues that dilution doctrine is misguided because it ignores consumer injury. Kratzke, supra note 12, at 285. He has a point: Dilution statutes do not commonly require proof of consumer confusion or an appropriate substitute. Properly conceived, however, I think dilution law is protecting consumers against a real harm: the loss of the informational value of a famous trademark through crowding. 93. Cf. Brown, supra note 1, at 1167 (noting the public interest bound up in these decisions). For a delightful exposition of this critical fact, which seems to have gotten lost in the debate over trademark law, see Litman, supra note 90, at 1725, who notes: "There has been inexorable pressure to recognize as an axiom the principle that if something appears to have substantial value to someone, the law must and should protect it as property. 
The Merchandising Right
First, there are a limited series of cases in which trademarks themselves have clearly become the valuable commodities. Sports team logos are obvious examples, as is the Nike "swoosh." People buy products like hats and tee-shirts because they have the logo emblazoned on them. 96 This is a rather striking reversal of the normal role of trademark law. Rather than identifying the good with a particular manufacturer, and thereby guaranteeing its quality, the identifier is itself the product. There is no reason to think that the Dallas Cowboys (or their licensee, who may not be identified at all) manufacture particularly high-quality hats, or even hats of constant quality. 97 Rather, the logo stands alone as a thing that customers value in and of itself.
Traditional trademark theory has a tough time dealing with this use of trademarks. If the goals of trademark law are to prevent consumer confusion, or to maintain product quality standards, there is no particular reason to give trademark owners the right to control such merchandising of their marks unless consumers in fact view the mark as an identifier of source.
98 Indeed, competition in the sale of Dallas Cowboys hats would arguably produce better hats at a cheaper price, and consumer welfare would be enhanced as a result. 99 But at least some of the cases that have been decided do appear to give trademark owners of sports logos an 97. See, e.g., MERGES ET AL., supra note 31, at 629 ("Indeed, many if not most sports logos are licensed to a broad array of products, many of differing degrees of quality. The 'high end' Red Sox cap ('just like the pros wear!') is a far different product-qua hat-than the cheap synthetic cap costing a few dollars and sold in discount stores.").
98. For an articulation and critique of possible arguments in favor of granting trademark owners control over expressive uses, see Daniel Kerman, The Expressive Function of Trademarks (Feb. 2, 1998) (working paper, on file with The Yale Law Journal).
Judge Kozinski suggests that for a certain class of goods-Veblen goods, which maintain their snob appeal precisely because only a few people can afford them-exclusive control over merchandising may help preserve the image consumers want to associate with the goods. 788-89 (1996) . It has been suggested that one reason consumers buy such products is because they know they are supporting the 'home team' financially. I am not sure this is a plausible explanation in the case of sports teams, and I seriously doubt it explains the purchase of Nike-logo tee-shirts. But if it did, sports teams or companies could compete by advertising the fact that money goes to support the team, whether or not they had exclusive merchandising rights.
exclusive "merchandising" right.l" Further, there is no question that an enormous amount of licensing activity proceeds on the assumption that they have such a right. The effect of such a merchandising right is to give trademark "owners" something they have never traditionally had: the right to control the use of the mark in totally unrelated circumstances. 1 ' Further, at least some courts have taken the merchandising right so far as to conclude that "consumer confusion" may occur where consumers are not in fact confused about the relationship between the two products, but nonetheless believe that the defendant might have needed a license to use the mark.
1 02 This right stems not from the traditional rationales for trademark protection, but from a sense of trademarks (or sports logos, at least) as valuable things that can be owned in and of themselves. 0 3
In these cases, trademark law is used to assert exclusive ownership rights over any commercial use of the mark in question, whether or not the use is "trademark use" or is likely to cause confusion as to the source. Merchandising rights divorce trademarks from the goods they supposedly advertise and therefore from trademark theory as well. The "Dallas Cowboys" trademark identifies a football team. The team can of course use trademark law to prevent competition by another team using the same name or even to prevent consumer confusion as to affiliation or sponsorship. But when trademark law reaches beyond that-when it precludes a haberdasher from selling a hat with the "Cowboys" logo, even when the circumstances preclude a finding of consumer confusion-it has left its theoretical foundations. The haberdasher is not using the "Cowboys" logo as a trademark; she is simply reproducing it. Consumers are not confused, at least assuming she uses an appropriate disclaimer and makes no false reference to an "official licensed NFL product." " Nor can the trademark owner make a plausible case that this competing sale will weaken the connection between the mark and the team. True, the Cowboys might make less money than they would if trademarks were absolute property rights, and they might argue that this "discourages investment." But so what? The point of trademark law has never been to maximize profits for trademark owners at the expense of competitors and consumers. And the investment at issue in these cases is not investment in the quality of the underlying product (the team), but in merchandising the brand itself. Brown quite sensibly suggests that this ought not to be the goal of the law." 0 5
Ironically, having accepted the merchandising rationale for certain sorts of trademarks, we may find it hard to undo. It is possible that consumers have come to expect that "Dallas Cowboys" caps are licensed by the Cowboys, not because they serve a trademark function, but simply because the law has recently required such a relationship. If this expectation exists, consumers may be confused if the law changes. 1 " 6 But a limited, likelihoodof-confusion rationale for keeping a bad law intact is quite different from a theoretical justification for cementing and extending the merchandising right. There are lots of famous marks and icons for which we have not granted merchandising rights. No one controls the exclusive right to make "Statue of Liberty" tee-shirts or paperweights, for example. 106. Lunney derides this sort of confusion argument as circular, see Lunney, supra note 19 (manuscript at 33), and, of course, in some sense it is. But if we are committed to basing trademark doctrine on consumer reactions, we are probably stuck with those reactions even if the law itself initially helped create them.
to take it any further, since it is hard to find any theoretical or statutory basis for the property approach to trademarks. 0 7
Nor should we be particularly concerned that consumers seem to want to treat trademarks as things in themselves. Most sociologists would look at the premium prices paid for certain brand logos as "irrational" preferences. If the consumer really is king, however, this may not be a fair judgment. 0 8 But it does not follow that because something is valuable it must be owned. 9
Licensing and Assignment of Trademarks "in Gross"
A second way in which trademarks are increasingly being treated as property involves the sale and licensing of trademarks without the accompanying business or goodwill of the company that developed them. Unlike copyrights and patents, which have the alienability attributes of real property,"' trademarks have never been freely alienable."' Indeed, selling a trademark without the accompanying business assets or goodwill is called "assignment in gross," and it can lead to the invalidation of the trademark."' Unsupervised licensing of a trademark can invalidate it as well." 3 The rationale for preventing free alienation of trademarks is closely tied to trademark theory.'
14 It is hard to see how the goals of preventing consumer confusion and encouraging investments in product quality would be furthered by allowing a company to sell the rights to a mark to another who will not make the same products. If anything, assignments in gross are vehicles for adding to consumer confusion, not reducing it. deterioration of the prohibition on transfers in gross is a reflection of the continuing judicial misunderstanding of the theoretical underpinnings of trademark law. As a matter of theory, the Nonetheless, the trend in trademark law clearly seems to be toward permitting assignments in gross and "naked," or unsupervised, trademark licenses. Indeed, one could even argue that GAT-T TRIPs compels such a change.' 16 While U.S. courts have not abandoned the rule against assignments in gross, they are more willing than ever before to permit transfers with minimal associated goodwill, particularly in the context of allowing financiers to take a security interest in trademarks.' 17 At the very least, the historic hostility of trademark law to any licensing has abated." 8 Judicial willingness to permit firms to sell trademarks as things in and of themselves is further evidence of the propertization trend that Brown abhorred in trademark law. It is also evidence of the disconnect between the law and trademark theory. Not only are assignments in gross unsupported by the traditional economic rationale for trademarks, but they do active damage to the goals of trademark law. The mental associations consumers make between trademarks and products are weakened by such transfers. 
C. Trampling on Free Expression
The expansive power that is increasingly being granted to trademark owners has frequently come at the expense of freedom of expression. As trademarks are transformed from rights against unfair competition to rights prohibition on transfers in gross should be a firm one."); Kratzke, supra note 12, at 247-49 (offering an economic rationale for the rule against assignments in gross).
Landes and Posner point out that trademark owners will frequently have an incentive to maintain the quality of goods they sell, even after a transfer of trademark rights in gross. Only in "final period" cases, where a company might want to spend down its stock of goodwill, will a transfer pose risks that a buyer will deliberately sell shoddy goods. Landes & Posner, supra note 19, at 274-75. Whether or not a transfer is part of a final period game, however, a consumer's mental association between a trademark and a particular product will generally be weakened by assignments in gross. Indeed, Landes and Posner themselves note that an assignment in gross makes economic sense primarily when it will involve confusing a significant number of consumers. 119. There is a positive economic case to be made for free alienability in general. Restraints on alienation generally interfere with the operation of the market and may prevent assets from being put to their highest and best use. While this is a powerful argument when applied td most assets, it is much weaker when applied to trademarks, since the asset is only supposed to exist in connection with particular goods made by a particular manufacturer.
to control language, our ability to discuss, portray, comment, criticize, and make fun of companies and their products is diminishing.
There are persuasive reasons to permit political and social uses of trademarks. 20 With the importance of brand image in today's economy, trademarks "form an important part of the public dialog on economic and social issues." 2 1 Many commentators have noted that modem expression frequently requires the use of trademarks in their role as social referents, whether or not the product itself is being discussed directly. 22 As Judge Alex Kozinski has noted: "Much useful social and commercial discourse would be all but impossible if speakers were under threat of an infringement lawsuit every time they made reference to a person, company or product by using its trademark." '"
But that is exactly what appears to be going on in a variety of contexts. Trademark laws have been used to preclude artists from painting in the same style as another, 4 to prevent an author from using the term "Godzilla" in the title of his book about Godzilla,'" to prevent a comic book from featuring a character known as Hell's Angel, 126 to prevent a satirical political advertisement from using the "Michelob" trademark to help make its point, 7 to prevent a tractor manufacturer from making fun of its competitor's logo in an advertisement,' to prevent a movie about a Minnesota beauty pageant from using the title "Dairy Queens," 1 29 to prevent a political satire of the O.J. Simpson case called "The Cat NOT in the Hat!" 30 to prevent individuals from setting up web pages critical of a company or product,' and to prevent a theme bar from calling itself "The Velvet Elvis." 1 3 2 Each of these cases involves the appropriation of a word or style, allowing the trademark owner to preclude even social discussion of the mark qua mark. Even more troubling, some of these cases seem designed precisely to prevent others from using a mark to criticize or make fun of a company. In still other cases, plaintiffs have tried without success to prevent a variety of artists, authors, political groups, news agencies, and others from using their trademarks.' 33 Even where these cases do not succeed, the fact that they are regularly filed and litigated to judgment may have a chilling effect on speech that happens to involve trademarks. 3 Further, trademark law is encroaching upon public discourse in another way: by seeking to control not just the terms of discourse, but also the depiction of the landscape as well. Landowners claim to have trademark rights in the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and Museum,' 35 the Chrysler Building,' 36 the fagade of the New York Stock Exchange 137 and numerous other buildings in Manhattan, 3 ' and even the shape of their golf courses. 9 They have sought to use these rights not only to prevent the construction of competing architecture, but also to preclude (or get paid for) the depiction of their buildings in any form whatsoever. 14 This latter power, in particular, interferes with a wide variety of noncommercial uses of these "marks."
Brown did not talk much about this use of trademarks, probably because no one in 1948 could seriously have thought the law would contemplate granting such a right. But there can be no doubt that he would have opposed this development. In these cases, trademark law is being used to suppress social, political, or artistic speech that happens to include the trademark. The defendants in these cases are not using the trademarks in a way that confuses the consuming public or destroys the trademark owner's incentives to invest in product quality. They are simply making statements that the trademark owner either does not like and wants to suppress, or for which the owner wants to collect money. Trademark theory offers no justification for this sort of suppression of speech. It is an unintended consequence of the tendency to give unfettered property rights to trademark owners.
III. RESTORING COMMON SENSE TO TRADEMARK LAW
If I am right that trademark owners are obtaining property rights that trademark theory cannot justify, what should be done? For the most part, I believe the courts can handle this problem, if they are vigilant in relating the protection plaintiffs seek to the principles of trademark theory and rejecting claims that are not well-founded on trademark principles. 4 142. Brown, supra note 1, at 1201. Brown thought this left no place for an antidilution statute in the trademark laws. I disagree. In limited circumstances, dilution can cause a loss of reputation-not immediately, but (as one court put it) as "an infection which, if allowed to spread, will inevitably destroy the advertising value of the mark." Mortellito v. Nina of Cal., Inc., 335 F. [Vol. 108: 1687
Courts should of course protect trademarks against uses that are likely to cause confusion, and against true cases of dilution. And they should be willing to recognize that trademarks can come in many forms, including product configuration, sounds, and colors.
1 43 But they should resist the inevitable attempts by trademark owners to expand these categories without limit. In particular, they should recognize that the Lanham Act is not a general anti-copying statute-and indeed that not all copying of a competitor's product is bad.
Eradicating the property rationale for trademarks, and restoring common sense to the Lanham Act, will be hard work. The forces arrayed in favor of propertization are powerful indeed. And it is true, as Brown points out, that "the restraining influence of the courts is largely passive." " But the courts do have some tools available for this project. The federal dilution statute vests great discretion in the courts in deciding whether a mark is famous. To date, courts have not imposed significant limitations on parties seeking to designate their marks as famous, but they certainly could (and should) do so. 45 Similarly, the distinctiveness and functionality doctrines, if broadly applied, will help distinguish those few cases in which product configurations actually serve a source-identifying function from the vast majority of products that are simply products. 146 Taking the likelihood of confusion requirement, the fair use doctrine, and the doctrine of nontrademark use 47 seriously will also help prevent unwarranted expansion of trademark rights in ways unforeseen by the drafters of the Lanham Act. 14 1 143. See generally Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995) (protecting the green-gold color of press pads used in drycleaning as a trademark and recognizing the wide range of protectable marks).
144. Brown, supra note 1, at 1206. 145. McCarthy wisely suggests that while dilution is a legitimate cause of action in some cases, "it is up to the judiciary to apply such potent laws with care and common sense lest they damage the competitive system they are designed to enhance." 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 83, § 24:114, at 24-209. At the very least, courts should heed the congressional statement that "famous marks ordinarily are used on a nationwide basis." H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995). For recent opinions that cabin the reach of the dilution statute somewhat, see I.P. Lund Trading v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27,42 (1st Cir. 1998), which holds that fame must involve more than simply having a strong, distinctive mark; and Jet Inc. v. Sewage Aeration Sys., 165 F.3d 419, 425 (6th Cir. 1999), which holds that a dilution plaintiff must show a greater degree of similarity between the marks than would be necessary in an ordinary trademark case.
146. See REsTATEMENT CTHIRD) OF UNFAIR COMP. §16 cmt. b (1993) ("Rigorous application of the requirements of distinctiveness and nonfunctionality is necessary in order to avoid undermining the carefully circumscribed statutory regimes for the protection of useful and ornamental designs under federal patent and copyright law."). For a detailed exposition of how to apply these doctrines in product configuration cases, see Oddi, supra note 61, at 137-60. 147. The latter two doctrines, properly applied, permit defendants to use words in their descriptive sense, rather than as a trademark, and to use trademarks to refer accurately to the trademark owner's product. See MERGES Er AL., supra note 31, at 574 (fair use), 711-14 (nontrademark use).
148. Alternatively, courts could turn the focus away from likelihood of confusion and towards the speech significance of the mark, at least in cases that involve expressive uses of trademarks. For one proposal along these lines, see Dreyfuss, supra note 39, at 418-19. Finally, the First Amendment stands (or should stand) as a bulwark against the increasingly common effort to use trademark law to suppress speech. 4 9 IV. CONCLUSION The world has changed dramatically since Ralph Brown wrote his 1948 article. Trademark law and trademark economics have both made significant strides in the last fifty years, but unfortunately, they do not seem to be marching in lockstep. Rather, the law has broken stride with economic thinking in dangerous ways. I do not think Brown would approve of the ways trademark law has changed in the last fifty years, but perhaps he would recognize them. He wrote: "In an acquisitive society, the drive for monopoly advantage is a very powerful pressure. Unchecked, it would no doubt patent the wheel, copyright the alphabet, and register the sun and moon as exclusive trade-marks." 1 50 We seem to be moving down that road. Unless we are careful, we may end up in a world in which every thing, every idea, and every word is owned. And we will all be the poorer for it. 149 . A detailed elaboration of the interaction between the First Amendment and the trademark laws is beyond the scope of this Essay. For one specific argument along these lines, see Lemley & Volokh, supra note 120, at 147. For a more general argument, see Cordero, supra note 122, at 608-28; and Denicola, supra note 40, at 158.
150. Brown, supra note 1, at 1206.
